









Primljeno: 17. 1. 2008.
The purpose of this paper is to study the contemporary relations
between transatlantic partners, USA and Europe, which represent
the wealthiest and politically and militarily strongest part of the
World, through consulting the relevant bibliography of American
and European authors of different political orientation and
worldview. The USA-Europe relations are characterized by
continuous ups and downs caused by: huge differences in
military and political power, different visions of international
relations and international community and competition between
American unilateralism and European multipolarism. The
relations between transatlantic partners always influenced the
process of European unification. The states that participated in
this process were often divided between because of their relations
with the USA. Division was clearly visible during the Iraqi crisis in
2002 and 2003, but it is also visible today. Where the division
was especially visible was NATO, the main guarantee of
European security and military-political organization with
capabilities to act militarily. The election of B. Obama for
President of the USA and a change in the White House became
the key factors that direct the US policy towards the
multilateralism and global leadership instead of global
hegemony. The USA must again become a leader, and at the
same time stop being a hegemon. That will positively affect its
relations with Europe and the World in general.
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The ColdWar Era definitely ended during the geopolitical tran-
sition of 1989-1991, which was characterized by the breakup
of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the
Warsaw Treaty and finally the breakup of the former Soviet U-
nion and Yugoslavia. After the geopolitical transition from the
Cold War geopolitical world order to the new geopolitical world
order entered its final phase, the USA remained a "lonely su-
perpower". It was the era of a swift change and turmoil. The
USA and Europe, which are undoubtedly the wealthiest and
the most powerful parts of the World, without real competi-
tors, remained unified in their objectives and the means to ful-
fill them. They also remained unified in the values consisting
of bringing peace, stability and prosperity to the eastern part
of Europe, thus consequently ending the 45-year-long politi-
cal, ideological, economical and military division of Europe.
The USA and Europe decided to keep what they gained
by winning the ColdWar and therefore decided to extend the
zone of security to the European neighborhood, with pro-
spects of extending it as far as they could, taking into consi-
deration their assets and security demands of the time. They
started to develop a broad security community, comprised of
NATO and Partnership for Peace member, from Vancouver to
Vladivostok. Besides that, the USA and Europe had to review
the foundations of their relationship. (Cornish, 1998)
The continuous American presence in Europe, since the
SecondWorldWar, left a sense of security, protection and con-
tinuity in Europe. But the first notions started to indicate that
the partnership was in crisis, because of the disappearance of
the common enemy and rising disproportion of military and
political power between themighty USA and the weak and on-
ly formally unified Europe. (Stewart, 2002)
The NATO and the EU enlargements gave the USA an op-
portunity to restore the transatlantic unity. But that chance
was definitely missed because of the transatlantic divide and
divisions between NATO members in Europe. The period of
the President Clinton administration, from 1993 to 2001, was ac-
tually a period of transition in the American-European relations,
which was generally very good and based on mutual respect
and equality, although the balance of power was completely
on theUS side.With the arrival of G.W. Bush to theWhiteHouse
in 2001, the American-European relations started to take a com-
pletely different path. Neoconservatives in the Bush adminis-
tration came up with a completely new vision of the World
and the role of USA in international relations. They intro-
duced the doctrine of preventive warfare, which includes pre-
emptive strikes against states that they designate as the spon-220
sors of terrorism or states that are trying to develop weapons
of mass destruction.1 (Nye, 2006)
President G. W. Bush's foreign policy seemed very arro-
gant and anachronistic to the Europeans.2 According to that
policy, the USA wanted to defend or isolate itself from the
World, and the only exceptions are the US military interven-
tions through which they get intensely involved in World
affairs. The continuation of Bush's foreign policy as the im-
plementation of the "Grand Strategy" guaranteed very limit-
ed success. Themain objective of that policy should have been
restoring security in a more dangerous world. But after the
first four years of Bush's presidency some midcourse correc-
tions were definitely needed. Washington again remembered
the "art of speaking softly" and the need for international le-
gitimacy. (Gaddis, 2005) The US doctrine of pre-emptive and
especially preventive warfare definitely needed to be aban-
doned, but happened only because of the financial burden,3
as well as the political burden that the war in Iraq put on the
USA, not because of the change of dominant opinion and stra-
tegy among the neoconservatives in the Bush administration.
The main problem in the American-European relations, be-
sides the disproportion in military power, is the difference in
political programs and differences in the view of the World.
Washington deals with rogue states and weapons of mass de-
struction (which did not actually exist in Iraq before the in-
tervention), and the Europeans are concerned for the future
of the Earth, especially regarding the global economy and cli-
mate change, the differences in wealth and the distribution of
the world's resources.
The traditional security challenges, oriented towards the
state and its interests, should not be as important in this peri-
od of globalization as they have been before. Europe today is
considering the development of its own military capabilities,
although it is not able to increase its national defense spend-
ing and establish a genuine common foreign and security po-
licy. The European Union is still fighting the challenges of
globalization, its own enlargement and the challenges of uni-
fication, especially of the depth of integration of its members.
The failure to establish a European constitution shows that
Europe is not as unified as some Europeans would like it to
be. Those with power in Brussels have still not gained legiti-
macy and those with legitimacy, as leaders of member states,
have less power. It is a relevant example of the democratic de-
ficit. (Tucker, 2003)
Globalization has even accelerated Europe's consciousness
of its specialty in theWorld, characterized by interdependence.
France is a good example, since it is substantially independent







is a member of NATO since its foundation. France has gradu-
ally gotten close to its European partners and NATO at the
field of security and the rest of Europe has gotten close to
France's views in the fields of ecology, culture and ethics.
The real differences inside Europe today exist between
states of the Western, Central and Eastern Europe. On the o-
ther side of the Atlantic, the Americans today understand that
flexible access to NATO is important for the long-term stabil-
ity of the transatlantic partnership. The USA should let the
Europeans prove themselves in the security field and wait to
see if their degree of engagement is in accordance with their
intentions. A strong and self-confident Europe is the condi-
tion of survival of the transatlantic partnership which will be
a necessity in the future. The more secure Europeans are, the
less they will be enthusiastic to solve their differences in an
immature way. A stronger Europe also means a stronger
NATO. The problem is the opinion that exists in Washington
that an independent Europe would not be competent and
could not function because of its dividedness. However, the
Americans should become aware of the price of turning to them-
selves. Bringing out the democratic values, peace and stabili-
ty to Eastern Europe and ensuring that Russia will not take
the wrong and dangerous path of isolation and hostility are
the objectives that can be reached only through a cooperation
of the USA and Europe. The global age has not changed the
fact that there can be no important international developments
without the USA. On the other hand, multiplying new players
in the international arena means that the USA alone can do
very little. Therefore, the World must accept the USA and
their leadership (but not their hegemony), and the USA has
to start learning about the complex and problematic reality of
the World. (Moisi, 2001)
The enlargement of NATO and the EU is also very im-
portant for the future of the transatlantic relations.4 The fu-
ture EU membership and transfer of the part of their sover-
eignty was also a test for these states because they had to give
a part of their justly gained sovereignty to supranational insti-
tutions in Brussels.
ORIGINS OF TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE
Before we start identifying the origins of the transatlantic di-
vide between the USA and Europe, we have to remind our-
selves that transatlantic relations have entered a new phase.
The change occurred after a decade long period of transition
and partnership with the inauguration of the president G. W.
Bush to the White House in January 2001, and especially after
the September 11th terrorist attack on the USA. Terrorism im-







ance andWestern democracies all over theWorld. For the first
time in history, NATO activated Article 5 of The North
Atlantic Treaty, which is the foundation of the collective defense.
The USA responded by attacking the regime in Afghanistan,
which was undoubtedly sponsoring terrorism. After a suc-
cessful change of the regime in Afghanistan, the US adminis-
tration started to focus on Iraq, accusing the Iraqi regime for
sponsoring terrorism and developingweapons ofmass destruc-
tion, although there was no evidence of it. The USA, together
with their allies formed a "coalition of the willing" and at-
tacked and occupied Iraq, although the UN weapons inspec-
tors confirmed that the Iraqi regime did not have weapons of
mass destruction. The attack was performed without the ap-
proval of the UN Security Council and without the support of
NATO, whose members were divided about supporting the
USA. (Roberts, 2003)
France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg took the side
opposite to the USA's. Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Den-
mark, Italy, The Netherlands and the newmembers fromCen-
tral and Eastern Europe supported the USA. This is the most
important cause of the transatlantic divide, at least the most
visible one. The real origins of the divide are deeper andmore
complex. The Iraqi crisis was a moment in history of the trans-
atlantic relations in which they were at the lowest point. The
division among the Europeans was at its peak.
After the attack on Iraq, American military power was at
its zenith, and its political and moral authority was at the bot-
tom. The great division became the characteristic of transat-
lantic relations, but it also started to characterize the relations
among European allies, who were divided in two groups of
states, colloquially called the "Old" Europe, which opposed
the USA, and the "New" Europe,which supported it.5 The trans-
atlantic division meant that NATO could become redundant,
because it would lose the ability to act and the purpose of its
existence. For the first time in the history of NATO, a consen-
sus could not be applied and the ability of NATO to act was
blocked. American-European relations, that were considered
to be the most important foreign relations of both sides since
the SecondWorldWar, and a testing ground for the foreign po-
licy of the American presidents, were completely brought in-
to question. (Nelson, 2002) No such differences and misun-
derstandings existed before, throughout the history of trans-
atlantic relations and especially in NATO, which was always
a prism that reflected the condition of transatlantic relations.
Bush's administration even failed in gaining support of
the USA's closest allies, and it did not even want to consider
European demands for a broad coalition against the regime in







W. Bush at the beginning of 2002, did not focus on the Al-
-Qaeda and help that the USA got from the European Allies in
Afghanistan. Instead it focused on the "axis of evil" in which
Bush put Iraq, Iran and North Korea, the rogue states that
were designated as the sponsors of terrorism. The fact that
the European Allies and NATO partners provided 85 percent
of ground troops in Afghanistan also was not mentioned. In
Europe, the response to American unipolarism and hegemo-
nic superpower was anti-Americanism, multipolarism and calls
for the unification of Europe and creation of unified Euro-
pean defense forces, independent of NATO. Questions were
raised about the real nature of the US military intervention in
Iraq. Was it a quest for the control of over more than ten per-
cent of the world's oil reserves? Was it an operation for the
establishment of a permanent US control over Iraq and the
neighboring states and regions, in a region that contains al-
most two-thirds of the world's oil reserves? Was it a demon-
stration of power and willingness to use it against the regimes
that oppose the USA? These are all legitimate questions that we
have to ask if we want to get an objective and comprehensive
view of the new American global policy and geostrategy, sum-
med up in the "Grand Strategy".
Basically, theoretical hypotheses on the transatlantic di-
vide in the Post-Cold War Era, and their proponents, can be
divided into two different groups. The first group of interna-
tional relations scientists and foreign policy experts considers
the transatlantic divide to be a natural consequence of vari-
ous factors, such as: disappearance of a common enemy that
homogenized the USA and Europe and improved their not so
ideal relations during some stages of the Cold War; huge gap
in military power, between the USA and Europe, which is
constantly increasing; different foreign policy priorities of the
USA and Europe, although a significant degree of concur-
rence in the official foreign policy goals exists on both sides of
the Atlantic. The second group of international relations scien-
tists and foreign policy experts mainly considers the transat-
lantic divide to be a product of Europe's divisiveness and dis-
unity when it comes to foreign policy, especially considering
relations with the USA and positioning towards the US poli-
cy regarding the Middle East region. According to some au-
thors the European disunity is simply a logical product of the
nature of the European Union, which is a supranational orga-
nization, and not a unified state. Others tend to blame the US
neoconservativism, unipolarism andhegemonic tendencies that
became the main characteristics of US foreign policy after Sep-
tember 11th, which they perceive as "casus belli" and a con-
venient momentum for the policy that was created long be-







-makers.7 American neoconservative intellectuals consider di-
vided Europe to be a good thing for the USA and its foreign
policy priorities, oriented towards global domination.
In this paper, we will therefore try to explore different and
opposed theoretical approaches that are focused on the ori-
gins and nature of the present transatlantic divide.
At the peak of the transatlantic divide in 2002 and 2003,
various hypotheses occurred about the relations between the
USA and Europe, and they became a part of public debates.
In Europe, many started to believe that it had much more si-
milarities and common interests with Russia thanwith the USA,
and that NATO existed only on paper. In the USA, many con-
sidered France and Germany to be the rivals of the USA, ra-
ther than allies. Divisions became even bigger after Germany
and France in the North Atlantic Council failed to vote to help
Turkey if it were attacked by Iraq as a response to the Ame-
rican attack on the Iraqi regime. They claimed that the attack
on Iraq was carried contrary to NATO's decision not to attack.
So the question of Iraq was a question that could have led to
the breakup of NATO. But it has never occurred and it is not
likely to either. Tensions and problems that occurred in NATO
were a consequence of the fact that NATO is an alliance of
NATO that participates in the alliance of their own free will.
Membership of the USA is important because of the military
power that it represents, but the USA also need partners be-
cause they cannot govern world politics on their own.
Opposing opinions claimed that the transatlantic link was
essential for both sides of the Atlantic, even more than before.
The crisis in transatlantic relations was actually a result of the
ruthless US unilateralism combined with the helpless Euro-
pean quasi autonomy. Bush's administration has managed,
through its unilateral and aggressive policy, to lose most of
the sympathy and good will that the USA has received after
September 11th and that has jeopardized the consensus that
was reached on the wider and more important global role of
NATO, achieved at the Prague summit in 2002. As a response
to the US unilateralism, France called upon the EU to take a jo-
int position against the American attack on Iraq and opposed
the official role of NATO in Afghanistan.
In the USA, a bitter debate has taken place between he-
gemonists and globalists, in the intellectual but also in the po-
litical field. Hegemonists comprise the core of today's ruling
elite in the USA, and by that we particularly consider the neo-
conservatives. Hegemonists are right when they argue that
power is the basis on which international relations are found-
ed. Globalists want to establish Kantian eternal peace, which
definitely does not seem realistic. Globalists claim that the







from its allies, in order to implement a successful foreign pol-
icy. For them, globalization is an irreversible and unstoppable
process. Not even the mighty USA and their unipolar power
can change it. Some problems, like for example global warm-
ing, cannot be solved in a unilateral way. Unipolar power can
reduce terrorist threats, but it can not exterminate them. Be-
sides that, cooperation can prolong the period of American
domination. If the USA is unable to create the necessary con-
ditions for prosperous and successful global governance, the
risks to their security are rising, and the example of that are
Iraq and the chaos there.
Europe has also gone through a strategic transformation,
but not as dramatic as the USA. Europe is basically trying to
prevent a conflict that would threaten the foundations of the
European Union, and its strategic priorities are very different
than those of the USA. Themain problem is a huge power gap,
particularly in military power, between the USA and Europe.
But there is also the problem of different visions of interna-
tional relations, especially in the willingness to use force in
promoting its interests. Europe lacks the military power but
more than that, it also lacks the unity and ability to use its po-
wer. Europe's view of international relations at the global le-
vel is that they should be multipolar and globalized, and the
view of the current US administration is hegemonic and uni-
polar. (Daalder, 2003) So, the perception of a threat, as well as
what to do about it, is very different depending on how a na-
tion views its place in the world.
TheEuropeanUnion's attitude towards the rest of theworld
is characterized by three paradoxes. It is much easier for the
Europeans to find a common view on external crises than on
American policy, which divides them. The second paradox is
that, while at the same time they have a common view of the
world's crises, the Europeans are divided on the topic of the
role of EU in managing these crises. The third paradox is the
fact that each time there is a risk of a crisis or even of separa-
tion fromAmerica, the Europeansmanage to reconcile differen-
ces on new bases. (Gnesotto, 2003) This paradox has been a cha-
racteristic of the US-European relations since the fifties, but it
was not so strong and visible during the Cold War. (Kaplan,
2004)
R. Kagan argues that the basic problem of transatlantic re-
lations is a huge gap in military power between the USA and
Europe, together with the political unity of the USA and po-
litical dividedness of Europe. When we add Europe's inabili-
ty to act as a united power as a result of a slow and compli-
cated decision-making process in the EU, the differences be-
come obvious.8 In a world where power is applied to main-







da to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the USA demonstrated the will
to use force wherever and whenever it found it necessary.
This is a world of Hobbes, a world described in his Leviathan,
where state power, dominance and force are the primary tools.
However, anarchy remains a predominant characteristic of
the international system, and not even the USA has the right
to represent itself as Leviathan, which should try to organize
the anarchical system according to its will. Anarchy does not
mean chaos, because the international system should function
in accordance with the international law. The system compri-
ses international institutions, which have to be the tools that im-
ply the rule of law and ensure global governance.
There is also a different, more realistic and more conser-
vative view of Europe's vision of world peace: The predomi-
nant strategic culture in Europe rejects power politics and re-
lies on the USA to be the European guardian. They could con-
tinue to live in a Kantian universe of perpetual peace. Europe
would enjoy its "post modern" zone of peace while acknow-
ledging the need for "modern" American power to protect it
and other regions from "pre-modern" threats. (Kagan, 2003)
But the reality wasn't so black and white at a time when Ka-
gan's book was published. Europe was completely divided.
The UK, as a traditional ally of the USA, as well as new NATO
and EU members gave support to the USA in dealings with
Iraq. Italy, Portugal, Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands al-
so supported the USA, and the reasons were conservative Eu-
ro skeptic governments in all these countries. These govern-
ments went completely versus the public opinion during their
decision-making process since the support for the interven-
tion in Iraq was well below 50 percent in these countries. Pu-
blic opinion support for sending troops to Iraq was evenmuch
lower.9 Decisions of these governments and the clear division
in Europe about the US policy influenced the efforts to create
a common foreign and security policy of the European Union.
(Santini, 2006)
New NATO members had clear interests in supporting
the USA, because they were dependent on the USA in terms of
their security and defense. They also wanted to improve their
status within NATO, which was possible only through sup-
port to the USA, which was symbolic, since they had no capa-
bilities that would really help the USA in Iraq. Their support
was and still is important to the USA in more than one way.
New NATO and EU members can contribute by making the
transatlantic partnership stronger, at a time when the rela-
tions between traditional transatlantic partners are showing a
significant degree of uncertainty, although they have been
improving since their lowest level in 2003. However, the sup-







granted; it is helpful for the US influence inside NATO and
the European institutions. The Allies from "New" Europe are
also to contribute in a practical way through diplomatic sup-
port and giving access to their territory during USA's strate-
gic operations. But the "New" Europe is not a substitute for the
"Old" Europe, although some would say, not yet. The "New"
Europe is not capable of fulfilling military obligations and de-
veloping capabilities necessary for becoming a strong military
factor. But their enthusiasm for the USA is very important,
because they view the USA as a benefactor, patron, and from
their historical experience they are used to having a "big bro-
ther", which is for the first time a choice they made indepen-
dently and it is not imposed on them.
THE CURRENT STATE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
It is not very realistic to expect that transatlantic relations will
return to the state they were before the Iraqi crisis. However,
new transatlantic pragmatism has started to develop after the
Istanbul Summit, held in June 2004. It opened the way to a bet-
ter and stronger partnership on both sides of the Atlantic. This
new pragmatism and improvement of relations, based on the
reality of common security interests, continued after the Sum-
mit of Riga. The situation in Iraq is unstable and chaotic, and
it threatens to destabilize the whole Middle East. Therefore, no
European state can let this happen, no matter what it might
think about the real nature and purpose of the American-Bri-
tish occupation of Iraq. Afghanistan also needs help on its way
to become a real democracy, and not a base for terrorists. The
foundation of transatlantic consensus is a common vision that
the projection of stability outside the Euro-Atlantic area is im-
portant for the security of NATO members. This new consen-
sus includes widening the area of interest and development
of new capabilities, so that NATO would be able to fulfill its
new missions outside the Euro-Atlantic area.
After the crisis in transatlantic relations, in the spirit of new
pragmatism, Germany tried to improve its relations with the
USA, but the real breakthrough happened after the govern-
ment changed, and the chancellor Merkel started the initia-
tive to improve the relations of the two countries. In France,
real improvements related to the USAwere possible only after
the inauguration of President Sarkozy. The new leaders of Ger-
many and France, from the center-right parties, had a differ-
ent approach to the transatlantic relations than their predeces-
sors. Germany even took the lead in the ISAF mission in Af-
ghanistan, together with The Netherlands. European support
in the fight against terrorism was never questionable, the dif-
ference between the USA and Europe was in the way that this







the Europeans accepted American and British occupation of
that country as a fact, since there was nothing they could do
about it.10
What the USA and the EU should accomplish is a genu-
ine partnership at a strategic level, and by doing that theywould
form a most powerful coalition that could resolve most of the
World's issues. TheUSA and the EU shouldmake an agreement
about three key aspects: economic partnership, security stra-
tegy and foreignpolicy. Enlargements ofNATOand theEUhave
broadened the perspective for cooperation on a political, eco-
nomic and military-security field, and it also created the op-
portunity for a complete integration of new members in the
institutions of the West, as a test of transatlantic partnership.
(Drozdiak, 2005)
At least two significant strategic challenges lie in front of
the USA and Europe as well, and they demand transatlantic
cooperation. The first strategic challenge is the transforma-
tion of states that are geographically located on the eastern
borders of new NATO and EU members, from the Baltic Sea
to the Balkans. The most important examples are the stabili-
zation of Ukraine, its improved democratization and stronger
orientation to the West, and regime change, democratization
and opening of Belarus to the West. The West also has to help
Russia to continue its transformation into a democratic, mod-
ern, and western-oriented state, which would also be a strate-
gic partner. The second strategic challenge is the develop-
ment and implementation of a new strategy towards the sta-
tes of Caucasus andCentral Asia, former Soviet Republics,which
face security and political challenges and economic difficul-
ties. The success of the West in integrating the states of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe gave a certain hope to those states,
that they have a chance for greater cooperation with NATO
and the EU. Their aspirations should be supported, since the
West needs a coherent strategy for the Black and Caspian Sea
regions, together with Central Asia. The USA should try to re-
linquish its tradition to define states as sponsors of terrorism
by its own free will, as well as they should try not to use force
unilaterally. Europe should try to take its position as a unified
political power about the kind of relations they want with the
USA. The European Union today has a Foreign and Security
Policy Representative, but it also has many other aspects of
foreign relations, like trade, economic and monetary relations,
which are under responsibility of the Commission. This kind
of decision-making process is not very effective, so the EU re-
mains a supranational organization, partially unified, andmo-
stly governed by national leaders, which draw their power from







The USA should learn to be a hegemon without acting as
one. If the US allies still believe that the American leadership
is crucial for solving the most important international pro-
blems, the challenge put in front of them is expressing criti-
cism in a way adequate for sincere debates among friends, and
encouraging American-European cooperation. The truth is that
the USA and Europe still need each other, and although the
USA is capable of waging wars on their own, it needs Euro-
pean allies for peace-making and peace-keeping operations.
Europeans need an ally that shares European values and in-
terests. The USA will remain the closest ally of Europe, and
international community needs this key partnership so that it
could maintain the current level of stability. The USA and
Europe have resources and capabilities to resolve the majori-
ty of international problems, when they act together.
In order to improve the current condition of transatlantic
relations, a new consensus should be reached between the
USA and Europe, which would express the idea of virtues and
values that both sides of the Atlantic are continuing to share.
The consensus would not be easy to reach, but without the true
sense of common destiny and future, the USA will be weaker
and even less predictable in their actions, and Europe will be
less self-confident and secure. (Sloan, 2003)
The other major breakthrough that should be achieved is
closing a gap in military capabilities between the USA and Eu-
ropean Allies. NATO needs certain strategic capabilities, but
European Allies should not try to duplicate military capabili-
ties of the USA. A lack of efficient strategy that would help to
create a democratic political alternative in the Arab world pre-
sents a much bigger problem. Europe can offer the most in
this area. Therefore, a comprehensive initiative is needed for
the Greater Middle East region, which would combine an ef-
fective defense against terrorist attacks with a political strate-
gy oriented towards gradual democratization of the Islamic
and Arab world. These important questions are crucial for the
improvement of the American-European relations, because
their differences are currently mostly focused at the way they
respond to terrorism. They are also focused at the complete
philosophy of international relations, on a global level, and at
the level of the "Arc of instability", that is comprised of theMid-
dle East, Northern Africa, Central Asia, and Caucasus regions.
(Jenkins, 2003)
The majority of skepticism in Europe about the speed of
integration comes from the awareness that Europe's defense
is dependent on the USA. Security and defense policy cannot
be put aside till other problems of European integration are







defense by incorporating NATO's achievements would be a
significant breakthrough in convincing the European citizens
that Europe is a genuine concept which deserves their sup-
port and participation. Europe should orient itself to its sta-
bility, participate in peacekeeping and peace-making missions
and project its influence on the regions that it borders.11 May-
be the Europeans would even be more productive without
the American help, but they are still not refusing it. Europe
has a larger population than the USA, an economy of approxi-
mately the same size, a modern industrial and postindustrial
base that is capable of competition, and it also has enough
political and military experience. So Europe is really capable
of taking care of its own security. So the survival of NATO is
not a given thing, and if NATO becomes redundant, maybe it
is something that should happen. Alliances are the products
of political pragmatism and when that pragmatism comes to
an end, it is time for a policy change. (Merry, 2004)
The next US administration should start to treat Europe
as an equal partner again. Washington should also reaffirm its
support for a strong, unified and Atlantic-oriented Europe, and
abandon the policy of dividing Europe. The model of establi-
shing "coalitions of the willing" and dividing Europe would
definitely fail in the long-term. That was visible when NATO
was unable to make decisions by consensus during the Iraqi
crisis. It was also visible when the American-European relations
got back on track, because even theWhite House of G.W. Bush
realized that Europe as a whole cannot be made to implement
the policy of official Washington. Part of Europe that opposed
the US policy realized that the USA was the stronger partner
and started to cooperate. We can also conclude that those Eu-
ropeans did not have many options, considering the impor-
tance, longevity and depth of the American-European relations,
as well as futile European resistance to geostrategic objectives
of the USA and the willingness and ability to realize them. A
lesson learned from the transatlantic divide after the Iraqi cri-
sis was that any attempt to build a unified Europe on the ba-
sis of anti-Americanism had to fail and that it represented a
path to the division of Europe. The issue of European integra-
tion and its relationship with NATO depends on the fact that
the integration of Europe could never be fully complete until
Europe takes the responsibility for its security and defense. En-
couraging political development of the EU, while promoting
security partnership with NATO, is the right way to build an
efficient European security system.
NATO should continue to maintain its position of a con-
tributing factor to transatlantic security architecture. NATO







curity, defense and political questions. Decisions must be an
expression of consensus within NATO, and made after a full
cooperation with international institutions and organizations.
The challenge for NATO is its survival, but also its role as a
key player in European security. The other view does not con-
sider the crisis in NATO so benign because two groups of mem-
bers in 2003, during the Iraqi crisis and blockade in NATO's
decision-making process, accused themselves for, on one side,
ruining the principle of collective security and, on the other,
the betrayal of principle of collective defense, which is one of
NATO's foundations, its cornerstone.12 (Barth Eide, Bozo, 2005)
EPILOGUE: THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
The main question that we have to pose about the future of
transatlantic relations, since the USA is clearly a much stron-
ger partner, is: Will the USA be willing to accept the balance
between the unilateral defense of its interests and the con-
structive cooperation with allies and friends in the interna-
tional arena, inside the international institutions and through
partnerships? Or will the USA simply implement its foreign
policies by force; losing at the same time the moral authority
that it used to have?
The answer to this question lies perhaps in the new par-
adigm that is called post-atlanticism. New pragmatic transat-
lantic relationsmay be perceived as an expression of post-atlan-
ticism. The main causes of this new condition in transatlantic
relations are: the disappearance of homogenic factors that the
Soviet threat represented and the rising Americanmilitary po-
wer and the willingness to use it, after September 11th. New
relations, post-atlanticist, comprised of a different set of rules
that are derived from hegemony and leadership, are pragma-
tically applied.13 According to these rules, the official Washing-
ton unilaterally decides and European Allies are expected to
obey without expressing their opinion. (Vaisse, 2003) These kinds
of relations characterize the transatlantic relations since Sep-
tember 11th. They seem to be completely natural and expect-
ed, according to the offensive realism international relations
theory. (Mearsheimer, 2002; 2006)
The cultural proximity of the USA and Europe influenced
the relations in a way that post-atlanticism did not become
characteristic of relations between the USA and Europe even
before. Post-atlanticist relations are possible since Europe, as
a unified factor, simply does not exist. Common European
foreign and security policy de facto exists only on paper. The
EU is trying to establish this policy, and also perceives this
autonomy as a positive impulse for the creation of European







downgrading the quality and meaning of transatlantic unity
that NATO has symbolized for over half a century. However,
the ability of Europe to compete with the USA is well beyond
the capabilities of even unified Europe. In the future, the USA
can expect a multidimensional NATO in which European sta-
tes will take their place in the American global strategy. The
USA thinks that the Europeans should respect the fact that all
Allies do have the same importance and that there are real dif-
ferences between them, according to the degree of coopera-
tion with the USA, and of course the differences in their own
capabilities. The US policy towards Europe can only be divi-
sive, until a unified Europe with a unified position starts to
exist, whether the USAwould want to be divisive or not. More
important is the level of this divisiveness. The USA could con-
tinue to take some European states, which agree with their po-
licy, into the "coalitions of the willing", and this policy can be
politically, militarily and economically successful and positive
for the US interests. The USA has stopped treating Europe as
a whole. According to that strategy, the USA should obvious-
ly be constantly involved in using the differences among the
European states, so that no initiative that would be complete-
ly opposed to the US interests and policy could succeed. Euro-
pe that is organized in thisway generally correspondedwith the
interests of the Bush administration policy.
There was also an opposite opinion that the future Euro-
pean integration, on the contrary, should not jeopardize the
foundations of NATO, and the USA should continue to give
stronger support to it. The USA needs a strong, self-confident
partner that will bring its political, economic and military sig-
nificance into the struggle against common security challen-
ges. The European support also helps the American policy to
gain the legitimacy that it needs and that makes it look more
justified in front of the international community. The USA
and the EU should remain unified and fight the common se-
curity challenges together and their alliance is inevitable. (Par-
si, 2003)
The conclusion that we can draw from different points of
view about the future of NATO is that the Alliance will not be
attractive for either side of the Atlantic if it does not continue
its transformation. NATO should confront itself with newUS-
EU relations and adapt to them or it will lose its importance,
and finally, it will lose its purpose, and that could do irrepara-
ble damage to the transatlantic community. The politicization
of NATO is not the solution. NATO should orient itself to its
foundations and become again a central mechanism for stra-
tegic coordination between the USA and Europe. But this could







If the USA continues to insist on unipolarism, hegemony and
military interventions by its own free will, and if Europe con-
tinues to insist on too much autonomy and opposition to the
USA in the field of security and defense, the future of NATO
will be doomed. A consensus on the situations that demand
military responses regarding out-of-area operations is need-
ed, as well as a consensus about promoting democracy and
human rights in the regions of Central and Southwestern A-
sia, as well as Northern Africa. These are the regions that form
the before-mentioned "Arc of instability".
But the main questions for the future of transatlantic re-
lations remain the following: Is the US hegemony of this vo-
lume and impact and thewillingness to usemilitary force whe-
rever and whenever the Administration considers it necessa-
ry, an anomaly? Or is it a characteristic of the US global poli-
cy that could become permanently present in the future? We
can also pose these questions in a more simple way: Is the
current US hegemony and unilateral policy a product of Sep-
tember 11th and the policy of the Bush administration, or an
expression of the US supreme hegemonic position and the be-
lief in its own predominance and ability to be a world hege-
mon? The question about US power is not does it exist and is
it the greatest in theWorld, but how to use it wisely and ratio-
nally so it does not antagonize the rest, or at least most of the
World. The World should respect the USA, and be afraid of its
hegemonic military and political power. And the USA should
lead, not dominate theWorld. For the USA, a leadership with-
out dominance and hegemony, and obeying of the internatio-
nal law and conventions should be the right global policy.
The end of the Bush era in Washington can be a decisive
moment for the next decade and the redefinition of the US
global policy, its interests, objectives and the means of fulfill-
ing those objectives. A new US geostrategy and strategy of na-
tional security represent a necessity that should be written and
implied in the next few years. The legacy of President Bush
and his administration, as well as its "Grand Strategy" repre-
sents a heavy burden for his successor, B. Obama, the new
President of the USA. There are basically three aspects in
which the policy of President Bush has seriously failed and
damaged the USA, its relations with Europe and the rest of
the World. The first aspect is the economy, since the policy of
complete deregulation of the financial sector is the main cause
of the world's financial crisis (that became an economic crisis
in a wide range) which spread from the USA to almost all parts
of the World, especially to Europe and Asia. Relations with a
number of Allies (members of NATO), the European Union,
Russia, China, and many other states represent a second as-







and it will take some time for the new US administration to
contain the damage and then build new, cooperative rela-
tions and a new, more positive perception of the USA and the
Americans in the eyes of theWorld. Violations of human rights
and international laws and conventions represent the third
aspect of the negative legacy of the Bush era, especially torture
and holding of suspects in confinement indefinitely in the US
Guantanamo base in Cuba. So the new US administration has
a very difficult task, especially if we have in mind the difficult
financial, military, political, as well as moral burden of the Bush
era: military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The European Union will probably remain a federation of
sovereign states, which will try to find a way to make its fu-
ture more certain, although we cannot rule out the possibili-
ty that the project of European unification will stop at the cur-
rent level. It is unlikely that Europe will transform itself into
a voluntary federation whose internal relations would be deep
enough to erase the centuries of development of the Euro-
pean Post-Westphalian system of sovereign and independent
states, exported to the whole world. It is amazing enough that
the legacy of centuries of wars and repression of stronger na-
tions and states against the weaker ones was put aside, once
the project of European unification had started. No doubt that
the European Union will remain an important factor in trans-
atlantic relations, but its importance will mostly depend on its
level of unity (or disunity?) about the support to the US global
policy. The character of US global policy, whether it will be u-
nipolar ormultipolar, will be a decisive factor that will influence
the position of most of the large and important European sta-
tes towards it. It will also influence the process of European
unification, but in the way that it has done before, since the EU
is unable to deepen the level of its integration. Considering
the enlargement of European integration, it is slowly, but sure-
ly reaching geographic and capability limits. The EU itself suf-
fers from "enlargement fatigue", after accepting twelve new
members and its increasing financial and economic problems,
which negatively influence its capabilities for future enlarge-
ments. However, this should remain an independent issue of
the European Union, and not an American-European issue.
NOTES
1 The doctrine of pre-emptive and preventive warfare represents a
breach of all legal acts of international law. There is not a single act
of international law that would support this doctrine, which was
first used by the Israelis in the Second (in 1956) and Third War (in
1967) against the Arabs, as well as in some later Israeli operations of
lower intensity against the Palestinians. However, the Arab coun-
tries surround Israel, and its survival was seriously endangered more







this Israeli preventive warfare. In the case of the USA, there are no
justifications for the doctrine of preventive warfare. The world's on-
ly superpower cannot claim that its survival is endangered. Terrorist
attacks represent a national security threat, but the US territory is
not threatened by any foreign power. The attack on the regime in
Afghanistan was justified, since it was beyond any reasonable doubt
a sponsor of terrorism and Afghanistan was a sanctuary for terror-
ists that attacked the USA. But the attack on the Iraqi regime, no mat-
ter how dictatorial and cruel that regime may have been, was not ju-
stified, since the USA was not threatened in any way by Iraq, and
the attack did not have any support in the international law. Not
even the NATOmembers supported it unanimously. It was the most
visible cause of transatlantic divide.
2 It is very important to note that nobody in Europe seriously con-
sidered the use of the neoconservative model of government, which
decisively influenced American president G. W. Bush, in a way that
the conservative ideology that created a sort of revolution in the
Reagan era inspired many conservative intellectuals in Europe and
influenced the political decision-making processes.
3 To see what kind of financial burden the Iraq war put on the US
economy we bring quotes from the book "The Three Trillion Dollar
War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict", by J. Stiglitz and L. Bilmes:
"There is no such thing as a free lunch, and there is no such thing as
a free war. The Iraq adventure has seriously weakened the U.S. e-
conomy, whose woes now go far beyond loose mortgage lending.
You can't spend $3 trillion on a failed war abroad and not feel the pa-
in at home." "President Bush tried to sell the American people on the
idea that we could have a war with little or no economic sacrifice.
Even after the United States went to war, Bush and Congress cut
taxes, especially on the rich – even though the United States already
had a massive deficit. So the war had to be funded by more borrow-
ing. By the end of the Bush administration, the cost of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, plus the cumulative interest on the increased
borrowing used to fund them, will have added about $1 trillion to
the national debt." "The United States will be paying the price of Iraq
for decades to come. The price tag will be all the greater because we
tried to ignore the laws of economics – and the cost will grow the lon-
ger we remain."
4 Throughout the nineties, NATO had to encourage membership
candidates to suppress their fears towards Russia. In 1999, three Cen-
tral European states (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) became
NATO members. In 2004, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Li-
thuania), Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became NATO
members. EU accepted all ten post-communist states that becameNATO
members, in 2004 and 2007. The post-Cold War EU enlargement was
obviously a process that was complementary to the NATO enlarge-
ment, and it followed it. Of the 27 current members of the EU, and
26 members of NATO, 21 states are members of both organizations.
Two states that were invited to NATO on the Bucharest Summit in
April 2008, Albania and Croatia, also want to join the EU. This is the








5 The "Old" and "New" Europe represent the terms, which were used
for the first time by the former US defense minister Rumsfeld in late
2002. The Old Europe related to the European states that opposed
the USA and the New Europe mainly to the new members of NATO
that supported US's global policy and intervention in Iraq.
6 The intellectual godfather of neoconservative philosophy is I. Kri-
stol. His work dates to the fifties and sixties. Contemporary neocon-
servative intellectuals are gathered in three important think tanks:
Project for the New American Century, American Enterprise Insti-
tute for Public Policy Research and Jewish Institute for National Se-
curity Affairs. The most prominent current neoconservative intellec-
tuals in the field of international relations and foreign policy include
R. Kagan and W. Kristol (co-founders of the Project for the New
American Century), R. Zoellick, N. Podhoretz, C. Krauthammer. Pro-
ject for the New American Century is a key association that gathered
most prominent neoconservative intellectuals and policy-makers. The
key policy determinant that they were promoting and turning into
official US foreign policy is the world dominance or global hegemo-
ny by the USA, which is and should be an empire. The fundamental
presumption is that American leadership is good both for America
and for theworld; and that such leadership requiresmilitary strength,
diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle. This should
be done bymaintaining US pre-eminence, thwarting rival powers and
shaping the global security system according to US interests. Project
for the New American Century in 1997 issued a Statement of Princi-
ples that drew four consequences from the American history that
should be principles of global US policy for the future: 1) increase de-
fense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global respon-
sibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future; 2)
strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes ho-
stile to our interests and values; 3) promote the cause of political and
economic freedom abroad; 4) accept responsibility for America's uni-
que role in preserving and extending an international order friend-
ly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles. Reference:
http://www.newamericancentury.org/
7 In the neoconservative policy-makers which were/are tied or formed
a key part of President G. W. Bush's administration we can count
Vice-President of the USA R. Cheney, C. Rice, P. Wolfowitz and D.
Rumsfeld. They are considered to be proponents of 'Neo-Reaganite'
strategy and have a key role in the statecraft in the post-September
11 American Foreign Policy. On the lower levels of the Bush admin-
istration in various periods these neoconservatives could be found:
R. Armitage, B. Jackson, Z. Khalilzad, J. Kirkpatrick, L. Libby, J. Mo-
ravcsik, and R. Perle. Of course, there were and still are many other
followers of neoconservative philosophy in the Bush administration.
The neoconservative philosophy influenced and still influences
President G. W. Bush more than any other political philosophy. Neo-
conservatives were the main architects of USmilitary intervention in
toppling Sadam Hussein's regime in Iraq and the occupation of Iraq
that has lasted until the present day.
8 The first premise in Kagan's book "Of Paradise and Power: America
and Europe in the New World Order" says: "It's time to stop pre-







world, or even that they occupy the same world". Kagan is one of
the most prominent neoconservative intellectuals today.
9 Discrepancy between the decisions of governments from the opin-
ion of their own citizens in some European countries, on the issue of
support for the US intervention in Iraq and sending troops to par-
ticipate in the attack on Iraq and its occupation, was clearly visible.
Public opinion polls showed it, during the Iraqi crisis. Besides that,
America's image in Europe then fell to its lowest levels. From late
2002 to mid-2003, according to the international poll (source: The
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press) support for the USA
in the UK, closest ally of the USA, fell from 75 to 48 percent, in Po-
land it fell from 80 to 50 percent, in Italy from 70 to 34 percent. In
Spain only 14 percent have viewed the US policy positively! Parallel
to this, support for greater European autonomy in foreign affairs
increased to 48 percent in Britain, 67 percent in France, 52 percent in
Germany, 63 percent in Italy and 60 percent in Spain. In the USA,
support for greater European autonomy was 29 percent! From these
numbers, we can conclude that the support for USA in Europe and
the support for greater European autonomy are dependent varia-
bles – while one increases at the same time the other decreases. The
main cause of this trend in Europe was American unipolar, militaris-
tic and hegemonic global policy.
10 One of the main reasons of disagreement between the USA and
most western European states is a perception of terrorism and the
ways to fight it. The USA insists that military and security forces, no
matter what the cost and means are, should fight the struggle aga-
inst terrorism. The USA got involved in the occupation of Iraq, and
the situation in Iraq today creates new terrorists, which simply did
not exist in Iraq before the American occupation. At the same time,
the European countries, through the cooperation of security, intelli-
gence and police forces are breaking up terrorist networks and pre-
venting terrorist attacks in Europe. The second problem is the US in-
sisting that Europe should increase its defense spending, and buy A-
merican conventional weapons. Europeans see no substantial rea-
son to do that because they do not have the enemy to use these
weapons on, since they do not plan to invade and occupy Middle
Eastern, Asian or African countries, and they do not agree that ter-
rorism can be successfully repressed by using weapons like military
aircrafts, aircraft carriers, rockets etc.
11 This concept is one concept of European security. The other two
concepts are different, since they either want to keep NATO stron-
ger and make the USA responsible for European security, or down-
grade the role of NATO and the USA in European security and try
to build up capabilities for Europe to take responsibility as well as
some roles that the USA have today through building strategic capa-
bilities for military interventions.
12 In a debate about the transatlantic divide, two authors, Barth Eide
and Bozo expressed their opposing views about the crisis in transa-
tlantic relations that occurred in 2002 and 2003.
13 An expression of new transatlantic relations was visible in the be-
havior of France, which would never express such opposition to US
policy during the Cold War. Although since the sixties France led an







of NATO, France never vetoed any decision of NATO. The example
of Germany is even more significant, because as a state that was,
besides the UK, the closest ally of the USA during the Cold War and
the first line of defense, with the biggest number of NATO troops on
its soil, with France it took a strong opposing side to the USA during
the Iraqi crisis. The USA deserves most credits for Germany's inde-
pendence after the Second World War, and its unification after the
fall of the Berlin Wall, and this should not be forgotten. And yet
Germany opposed the USA inside NATO over the issue of Iraq.
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Rad kroz konzultiranje relevantne literature ameri~kih i europ-
skih autora razli~ite politi~ke orijentacije i svjetonazora istra`uje
suvremene odnose transatlantskih partnera, SAD-a i Europe, koji
su najbogatiji te politi~ki i vojno najja~i dio svijeta. Odnose
SAD-a i Europe karakteriziraju stalni usponi i padovi, uzrokovani
velikim razlikama u vojnoj i politi~koj mo}i, razlici u vizijama
me|unarodnih odnosa i me|unarodne zajednice te nadmeta-
njem ameri~kog unilateralizma i europskoga multilateralizma.
Proces europskog ujedinjavanja oduvijek je bio obilje`en
odnosima transatlantskih partnera, a dr`ave koje su sudjelovale i
sudjeluju u tom procesu ~esto su se dijelile me|usobno zbog
vlastita odnosa prema SAD-u, {to je u recentno vrijeme bilo vrlo
izra`eno prilikom ira~ke krize 2002. i 2003. godine, ali je prisu-
tno i danas. Podjela je bila posebno vidljiva unutar NATO-a,
vojno-politi~ke organizacije s mogu}nosti vojnoga djelovanja i
glavnog aktera europske sigurnosti. Izbor B. Obame za pred-







benici koji politiku SAD-a usmjeravaju prema multilateralizmu i
globalnom vodstvu, umjesto globalne hegemonije. SAD mora o-
pet postati vo|a, a istodobno prestati biti hegemon. Ovo }e pozi-
tivno utjecati na ameri~ke odnose s Europom i svijetom u cjelini.
Klju~ne rije~i: SAD, ameri~ka globalna politika,
neokonzervativci, Europa, transatlantski odnosi
Überwindung des transatlantischen
Zwiespalts: Die Beziehungen zwischen
den USA und Europa und ihre Auswirkung
auf die Vereinigung Europas
Petar KUREČIĆ
Kroatisches Parlament, Zagreb
Anhand relevanter Publikationen aus der Feder amerikanischer
und europäischer Autoren unterschiedlicher Orientationen und
Weltanschauungen untersucht der Verfasser dieser Arbeit die
zeitgenössischen Beziehungen der transatlantischen politischen
Partner USA und Europa als des wohlhabendsten sowie politisch
und militärisch einflussreichsten Teils der Welt. Die Beziehungen
zwischen den USA und Europa sind gekennzeichnet durch
Höhen und Tiefen, denen große Unterschiede im militärischen
und politischen Machtbereich zugrunde liegen, ferner abwei-
chende Vorstellungen davon, wie sich die Beziehungen innerhalb
der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft gestalten sollten, sowie
der Wettstreit zwischen US-amerikanischem Unilateralismus und
europäischem Multilateralismus. Der europäische Vereinigungs-
prozess ist seit jeher durch die wechselhaften Beziehungen
zwischen den transatlantischen Partnern gekennzeichnet, und oft
waren die EU-Staaten wegen ihres jeweiligen Verhältnisses zu
den USA untereinander uneinig; in der unmittelbaren Vergan-
genheit kam dies während der Irak-Krise 2002/2003 sehr stark
zum Ausdruck, ist jedoch auch heute spürbar. Ganz besonders
stark ausgeprägt ist dieser Zwiespalt innerhalb der NATO, deren
Machtbefugnisse sich auch auf bewaffnete Interventionen aus-
dehnen und dieses militärisch-politische Bündnis zum wichtigsten
Akteur der Sicherheit in Europa machen. Die Wahl B. Obamas
zum US-Präsidenten und der Paradigmenwechsel im Weißen
Haus sind die Schlüsselfaktoren für einen Umschwung in der US-
amerikanischen Politik und eine Ausrichtung auf Multilateralismus
und globale Führer- statt Vorherrschaft; die USA stehen vor der
Aufgabe, erneut die Führung in der Welt zu übernehmen, ohne
sich jedoch zum Hegemon aufzuwerfen. Obamas Wahl wird sich
ohne Zweifel positiv auf die US-amerikanischen Beziehungen zu
Europa und zur Welt insgesamt auswirken.
Schlüsselbegriffe: USA, US-amerikanische Außenpolitik,
Neokonservative, Europa, transatlantische Beziehungen241
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